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The Likely Business Model Numerous alternative research firms have asked us why we think firms like Goldman Sachs and others have undertaken extensive initiatives to market various investment tools and alternative research providers to their mutual fund and hedge fund clients. We suspect that the major reasons for today's environment is the move to unbundling in the UK, the growing acceptance of CSAs and CCAs around the world, and the requirements of new regulations like Reg NMS and MiFid that mandate "best execution". These developments have created a scenario where the largest investment banks and broker dealers face both a significant opportunity and a tremendous threat. The threat is that some firms could potentially suffer a loss in "research commissions" as buy-side investors make independent decisions who they want to use as their execution providers and who they want to pay for their research. The opportunity, however, is that the largest brokers in the world could experience a significant increase in their execution market share.
Consequently, a number of bulge bracket firms have come to the conclusion that they can make up for some of the potential losses in research commissions they might suffer in an unbundled world, and they can increase their share of the equity commission pie, if they offer valuable services that their competitors don't provide. This is why some investment banks have decided to market innovative and unique alternative research to their clients – in order to attract the additional execution business that the buy-side will need to direct to them in order to pay for these services. The Commercial Based on our estimates, the alternative research industry generated approximately $1.81 billion dollars per year in revenue in 2006, and is likely to grow by close to 37% over the next five years, to reach almost $2.5 billion by 2010. The growth in this business is based, to a large extent to the growth in hedge funds, the introduction of hedge fund like instruments at mutual funds, and the extension of unbundling in the Of the current spend, over a $1 billion of it is paid by using traditional third-party soft dollars which grossed up at tradition soft rates represents approximately $1.2 billion in execution order flow. Going forward more third party research will be paid through the use of CCAs which will represent a higher ratio of execution than traditional soft dollars. Of the incremental $700 million in growth we project over the coming five years, at least half would be through CCAs. In addition, of the total $10.9 billion in total institutional equity commissions generated in 2006, we estimate that second and third-tier brokerage firms collected about $2.9 billion in total commissions. The proliferation of CSAs and CCAs suggests that the portion of this total used to pay for execution could be captured by bulge brackets firms ($1.4 billion) as the buy-side chooses to pay for this research through a limited number of CSA brokers. As an aside, as unbundling progresses, the $1.5 billion currently paid out in research commissions to these second and third tier firms will also be vulnerable as a number of second and third tier brokerages will not be able to compete as their execution revenues disappear (e.g. Prudential Equity Group). As a result, we estimate that between $500 million to $600 million of the research revenues currently directed to second and third tier brokerage firms could eventually be captured by alternative research providers. However, from the perspective of CCA brokers, the $1.5 billion is still an opportunity, however it is split. As a result of this analysis, the market opportunity for bulge bracket firms which build robust alternative distribution platforms is to grab a dominant share of the $3 billion in equity commissions used to pay for third party research. This is comprised of $1.55 billion in commissions used to pay for alternative research ($1.2 billion in soft dollars today plus $350 million in incremental CCA commissions over the next five years) and $1.5 billion of commissions used to purchase second and third-tier brokers' research. Of course, it is obvious that the only way a firm can compete for this business will be if they are considered a "best execution" provider. However, we also suspect that the investment banks that build the most compelling brand and the most robust suite of services around finding and providing unique and innovative alternative research to their clients is likely to get the lion's share of this business.
Some might wonder how, in an unbundled environment where "best execution" is the driving force, they can effectively create a new bundle by convincing their clients to direct the additional execution flow to them in order to pay for these alternative research services. It is clear that buy-side clients will have the ultimate say about how they pay for third-party research (as they do today). In addition, various systems are being developed by numerous software vendors to help institutional investors manage how their research payments are allocated. Despite these developments, some firms obviously believe that as long as they are deemed a "best execution" provider, that the ultimate determinant of whether they get the execution business or not in an unbundled world will be based on two factors – personal relationships and the quality of services provided by the bank.
The one bulge bracket firm that has moved most aggressively in this space in the past year has been Goldman Sachs with the introduction of its Hudson Street Services alternative research platform. In fact,
In the longer term, Ultimately, we believe that one of the reasons Goldman has been so aggressive in this area, is because they believe that the firm will eventually be branded as the place clients can go to find and pay for innovative new tools, data sources, and research services. As a result, we think that The Rest of the Street
Perhaps the biggest issue is how to reconcile alternative research with an investment bank's own proprietary research. The bulge firms are understandably reluctant to cannibalize their own research business and have concerns that distributing alternative research will ultimately dilute their distribution of proprietary research. A related fear is that proactively selling alternative research will accelerate unbundled pricing of proprietary research, a situation most banks would like to forestall as long as possible. Goldman's Despite these issues, it is clear to us that the other bulge bracket investment banks face a limited window of opportunity to develop and implement an alternative research strategy given the progress that |
| Bill George July 9, 2007 12:15 PM PDT In my opinion the comment above, by David Miller, is right-on the money. It’s sort of amazing to me that investors can’t come to the conclusion that was reached by the regulators who put together the Global Analyst Research Settlement. Under that penalty arrangement the regulators felt it necessary to mandate rigorous safeguards and strict regulatory oversight to insure that the independent research to be distributed by the firms being punished would remain independent.(1) Why doesn’t the market understand the risks of compromised independence? Admittedly Goldman’s distribution network and marketing approach are different from most bulge bracket firms. Most of other bulge bracket firms have significant retail distribution resources which Goldman doesn’t have; but, everybody should see the problems of believing that independent research providers can maintain their independence once they have whiffed the heady vapors of fame and fortune delivered by serving the sometimes conflicted interests of investment banking brokers with powerful distribution networks. It’s very odd to see the market’s reaction to emerging paradox of “captive independent” investment research. Perhaps what seems to be wide acceptance, by professional investment advisors, of this “captive independent research” concept is caused by the more or less natural interdependence of institutional advisors and broker dealers (an interdependence which is described, in part, by David Miller’s post above). For years, after 1932, the interdependence and collusion between advisors and broker dealers was made difficult by The Glass-Steagall Act. However, the Glass-Steagall Act was emasculated during the late stages of the 1990’s Tech Bubble; so now it seems professional investment advisors and brokerage firms are eager to marginalize, (or compromise) independent research and get back to the business of trading favors for their mutual benefit to the detriment of the investing public. (2) Footnotes: (1) See Wikipedia entry Global Settlement > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_settlement (2) See Glass-Steagall Act > http://www.bizjournals.com/memphis/stories/1998/12/14/focus4.html | ||
| David Miller July 9, 2007 12:18 AM PDT When we're talking about the value of research to Wall Street firms, I wish we'd quit prancing around the elephant in the room. Any firm that depends on hedge fund trading revenue (excepting those that compete solely on price) will not last long as a business without a research arm. The more dependent the firm is on trading revenue, the more necessary a trading arm is. Research arms of these firms are now expected to assist their clients' positions. Have a major client buried in a long position? Research sends out an aggressive buy recommendation. Have a major client buried in a short position? Research sends out an aggressive sell recommendation. Since financial media outlets are conditioned to report such things, especially the more outrageous they are, these conflicted research notes will have the desired effect in the market, partcularly in the small cap stocks where these Wall Street firms make their living. NASDAQTrader.com used to have an application where you could watch the trading volume for different market participants over time for a particular stock. When it was updated monthly, it was a great dentiment indicator for how hedge funds thought about a company. If you saw an unusual research opinion, watch the volume to that firm. If it jumped, then that's the way the hedgies were leaning. I've had people argue that this is the way the sell side is supposed to work. People are just "voting" with commission dollars for the research. I give that the same weight I give to people who tell me the earth is flat. Write the research your clients need to make their positions more profitable and you'll be rewarded. If any of us "independent" research firms *choose* to play this game, we can be equally successful as sell side research. Pick any moderately successful independent firm and you'll discover all their top people could be making much more money at a sell-side firm. Some of us, however, put more weight on being able to look at ourselves in the mirror each day. We want to write what we actually believe about a company instead of worrying about whether the head of trading will have us on the carpet for writing something counter to a major client's book. | ||
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